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7. The rise of risk-based regulatory capital:
liquidity and solvency standards for
financial intermediaries
José Gabilondo
INTRODUCTION
In a capitalist economy, a private firm seeking finance must negotiate
with prospective investors in the open market, which establishes stand-
ards about the terms on which debt and equity investment will be
forthcoming. In addition to these market-financing standards, the capital
structure of some financial firms—particularly broker-dealers, federally
insured depository institutions, and insurance companies—must satisfy
other requirements imposed by federal or state regulators to promote
liquidity and solvency. Regulators take a heightened interest in these
firms because they serve a public function in providing credit and other
financial services. To grasp what regulatory capital rules try to accom-
plish, the reader must make a conceptual shift to see these financial firms
as highly leveraged borrowers, contending with the demands of their own
creditors. From this perspective, the financial stability of these firms
becomes a matter of public concern.
The first section explains regulatory capital as a corporate finance issue
about how capital structure can protect creditors—especially unsecured
ones – from unexpected financial losses. The rest of the chapter examines
the major features of the regulatory capital regimes that apply to financial
intermediaries. The second section starts with depository institutions, i.e.,
banks. These standards have become the locus of policy debates about
risk-based capital. The third section discusses the regulatory capital rules
that apply to broker-dealers registered with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”).1 Broker-dealers have long been subject
to net capital rules that promote the firm’s liquidity in order to promote
1 Futures commission merchants are also subject to regulatory capital. For a
comprehensive discussion of their requirements, see Jerry Markham, The CFTC
Net Capital Rule–Should a More Risk-Based Approach be Adopted, 71 Chicago-
Kent L. Rev. 1091 (1996).
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orderly self-liquidation. More recently, large broker-dealers have been
allowed to adopt a risk-based method—akin to that used in bank
capital—for meeting their net capital requirements. The fourth section
considers insurance companies, which adhere to risk-based capital stand-
ards imposed by state law. The fifth section warns that large, complex
financial organizations may find themselves inadvertently subject to
bank-style capital rules if deemed “systemically important” by the newly
created Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).
REGULATORY CAPITAL AS A CORPORATE FINANCE
PROBLEM
Firms finance their activities by borrowing, issuing equity shares or
retaining earnings. Borrowing and share issuance lead to dramatically
different claims against the issuer in terms of how it must allocate profit
and the extent to which investors can participate in the firm’s governance.
According to the terms of their contracts, creditors are paid first,
receiving what they lent plus interest. To enforce their seniority, creditors
can sue for breach. In contrast, the purchasers of a firm’s equity own the
firm, which gives them a junior but residual interest in a firm: they are
paid only after creditors, but they keep the entire residue.
An issuer’s balance sheet matches its asset holdings (listed on the
left-hand side) with its capital structure (arrayed on the right-hand side).
The capital structure arranges the claims of investors in a hierarchy that
prioritizes creditor claims and subordinates those of owners. Creditor
claims are generally listed in order of descending priority, moving down
through hybrid instruments like subordinated or convertible debt, and
ending with residual claims like preferred stock and—the sanctum
sanctorum of the residual—common stock.
This hierarchy establishes which claim will bear loss when the firm
suffers one. For example, when the firm recognizes a loss on an asset, an
offsetting deduction must be made on the right-hand side of the balance
sheet, because of the accounting identity providing that the assets must
equal the sum of equity and liabilities. The liabilities do not bear the
asset loss because they are liquidated sums that not do adjust on peril of
contract breach. It is the equity that must bear the burden of adjusting to
loss in the value of assets. In effect, asset loss makes the balance sheet
“shrink up,” in that equity shrinks dollar-for-dollar along with the loss. In
this sense, equity involves a “first loss” position.
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This residual capital cushion may have different names in different
legal vehicles, but its function in absorbing loss is the same.2 Making
equity bear loss first helps to protect the interests of creditors—especially
unsecured ones—from unanticipated loss. The deeper a firm’s capital
cushion, the longer it will be able to withstand loss without creditors to
unexpected loss.
The firm can also become more leveraged (and suddenly illiquid)
without shrinking assets when the issuer takes on new liabilities, espe-
cially unexpectedly. Assuming that the asset portfolio stays the same as
liabilities increase, the adjustment required by the accounting identity
will again happen in the equity account. In effect, the new liabilities are
treated like another “first loss” that is borne by the equity account. This
time, the balance sheet stays the same size, but it has become more
leveraged as in the shrinking asset case in the first example. A recent
example is the detonation of contingent liabilities in the AIG Financial
Products Unit when its credit default swaps became out-of-the-money.
When courting a lender in the open market, all firms must contend
with the loss and leverage dynamics described above. Banks, broker-
dealers, and insurance companies must also contend with regulatory
requirements about their capital structure. Regulators justify the impos-
ition of these rules in the name of several public interests including
protecting customers and other counterparties from the firm’s financial
instability, promoting stability and integrity in payments and financial
services, and shielding the public fisc from clean-up costs when these
firms go broke.
As do those demanded by the open market, these requirements address
a firm’s overall asset-liability structure for similar ends. Both market and
regulatory capital rules seek to ensure that the firm will have (i) enough
liquidity to meet maturing obligations timely, and (ii) a permanent pool
of financial reserves that can absorb unexpected losses without impairing
the rights of creditors. So at every moment, broker-dealers, banks and
insurance companies are subject to the more exacting of either market or
regulatory demands about capital structure (much as U.S. taxpayers are
always liable for the higher of their regular income tax liability or that
calculated under the alternative minimum tax).
Most of these standards are considered “risk-based” because they
attempt to take account of the particular risk of firm’s financial structure
2 For example, in a special-purpose vehicle set up to securitize receivables,
the account that bears the risk of loss may be called an “excess spread” account
or simply a “first loss” position.
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rather than using gross balance sheet values. On the asset-side, regulatory
capital creates incentives to hold particular assets by influencing the cost
of holding them. On the other side of the balance sheet, these rules limit
the firm’s ability to leverage itself. As a result, these firms have both a
conventional balance sheet and what may be thought of as a regulatory
balance sheet. From a firm’s perspective, one should understand these
rules in terms of how they impact a firm’s balance sheet at a point in
time, e.g., “What will making this loan cost in terms of regulatory
capital?” or “What kind of assets can we support by issuing this kind of
preferred stock?”
Among financial firms, banks face the most comprehensive regulatory
capital rules for two reasons. First, banks are illiquid by design. Banks
borrow at short-terms (including on an overnight or demand basis) and
then deliberately mismatch their balance sheets by making loans with a
longer term, often at fixed rates. This mismatch is no mistake. Rather, it
is how banks provide long-term credit on terms that consumers can
afford. Profit, not social altruism, drives this mismatch because banks
capture a positive net interest spread, since long-term funding rates tend
to be higher than short-term interest rates. This mismatch, though,
periodically drives some banks—and at times the banking sector as a
whole—into liquidity crises.
The second reason is that deposit insurance shifts liquidity and
solvency risks from federally insured banks onto the federal government.
It is as though the federal government has a residual loss interest (with no
offsetting upside). This creates a perverse incentive for bank managers to
invest in excessively risky assets when their own capital has declined. In
this situation, the owners have little to lose and much to win if the risky
investment (funded with taxpayer money) goes well. The severity of bank
capital requirements might seem unreasonable (as banks often urge) but the
burden must be put in the context of the funding advantages that banks
enjoy—cheap deposits and privileged access to central bank liquidity.
Firms try to reduce the cost of complying with regulatory capital,
considered a form of “regulatory arbitrage” by its critics. For example,
given that many assets are valued at historic cost, a firm can enhance its
earnings (which will eventually flow into an equity account) by selling
assets with built-in gain and postponing the sale of assets with built-in
loss.3 A more structural form of regulatory arbitrage plays out in financial
3 Larry Wall and Pamela Peterson, Banks’ Responses to Binding Regulatory
Capital Requirements, Economic Review 1–17, 8, Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta (March/April 1996).
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conglomerates that operate securities, banking and insurance businesses
separately. Faced with a transaction subject to regulatory capital, a
conglomerate may have a choice about which of its regulated businesses
should be assigned the transaction. Because different business lines are
subject to different capital standards, the decision about where to book a
deal will tend to consider its regulatory capital implications.
BANKS
Today, the Federal Reserve (“Fed”), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (herein-
after “the agencies”) subject banks to an expanding regime of regulatory
capital, most of them risk-based.4 To some extent, U.S. banking regula-
tors have always taken risk into account when evaluating whether a
bank’s capital was sufficient given its loan base.5 During most of the
twentieth century though, regulators tended to make subjective determin-
ations about a particular bank’s capital adequacy, often by comparison to
peer banks. The Fed had begun experimenting with a more formal
risk-based capital approach in the 1950s, but there was no consensus
among the agencies about how to apply such a standard.6
In the 1980s, U.S. regulators began using bright-line ratios that
quantified capital adequacy by comparing assets to equity in order to
track how deep the bank’s loss-bearing cushion was.7 These early efforts
introduced features—like capital ratios and a hierarchy of loss-bearing
capital instruments—that would become permanent parts of the regula-
tory approach, discussed below.
Institutionalizing Risk-Based Capital
As banks became more active in international markets in the 1980s,
regulators concluded that more international coordination was needed to
avoid a “race to the bottom” in which international operations would be
4 For an excellent analysis of rationales for regulating bank capital, see Heidi
Mandanis Schooner and Michael Taylor, Global Bank Regulation: Principles and
Policies 13–45 (2010).
5 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Basel and the Evolution of Capital
Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back 1 (Jan. 14, 2003).
6 Malcolm Alfriend, International Risk-Based Capital Standard: History and
Explanation, Economic Review 28–34, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
(Jan./Feb. 1988).
7 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 5, at 1.
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based in the country with the most lax regulations. Moreover, the
business of banking was changing as many banks began experimenting
with off-balance sheet items like over-the-counter derivatives.8
In 1974, a group of major central banks under the auspices of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”) began working on a
risk-based capital standard to apply to internationally active banks.9 In
1987, the group’s first major proposal—the Basel Capital Accord (“Basel
I”)—proposed a framework that tied the minimum capital of inter-
nationally active banks to the estimated risk in their asset portfolios. This
proposal would serve as a guideline for implementation by countries
through national legislation.
Basel I coincided with efforts in the U.S. to strengthen capital
requirements for banks after a series of banking crises in the 1980s.
Congress had passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (“FDICIA”), which imposed risk-based capital stand-
ards on all banks, even domestic ones with little international activity.
FDICIA established a rating system that classified banks into five
different categories based largely on their capital adequacy.10 In this
system, maintaining adequate capital was the only way to avoid admin-
istrative penalties, including more examinations, the denial of requests to
acquire other banks, requirements to raise capital or suspend dividends,
and, in the extreme case, the withdrawal of deposit insurance or the
bank’s charter.11 The goal was to look beyond accounting formalisms to
more conservatively identify how much real loss-bearing capital a bank
had. FDICIA and Basel I worked in tandem to institutionalize risk-based
capital for banks.
In effect, the approach involved constructing a regulatory balance sheet
by making conservative adjustments to a bank’s financial balance sheet
and then testing this pro forma balance sheet against capital adequacy
standards established by regulators.12 The first step in building this pro
forma balance sheet was to deduct assets that had no actual liquidity, e.g.,
8 Larry Wall and Pamela Peterson, supra note 3, at 1–17, 2.
9 The original members were Belgium, Canada, France, German, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm.
10 Larry Wall and Pamela Peterson, supra note 3, at 1–17, 3.
11 Id at 1–17, 3–4.
12 This chapter uses several stylized balance sheets to illustrate how regula-
tory capital requirements apply to banks and broker-dealers. Because the goal is
to illustrate general aspects of these requirements, this chapter makes simplifying
assumptions about the capital ratios, asset risk-weights, haircuts, and other
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goodwill. The right-hand side of the balance sheet would also be
adjusted, “shrinking up” as discussed previously.
Some assets—like cash—were deemed so free of risk that a bank
could fund them entirely with borrowed money; hence, no equity needed
to be assigned to them to bear the risk of unexpected loss. Most assets,
however, would require a minimum amount of equity to provision for the
risk of unexpected loss. So the next step in constructing the pro forma
balance sheet was to identify which asset—or which fraction of gross
assets—would have to be financed by some blend of debt-leveraged
equity. To this end, Basel I introduced a scheme that assigned different
risk-weights to assets based on differences in their relative credit risk:
0 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent.
These risk-weights determine how much of the asset a bank must fund
by some qualifying blend of debt and equity. By implication, the
difference between 1 and these risk-weights expressed how much of the
asset value can be funded entirely by debt, unbacked by equity. For
example, holding $100 in cash exposed a bank to no default risk, so the
bank could finance a cash investment entirely with borrowed money. This
was accomplished by giving the cash a risk-weight of 0 percent.
A bank could fully debt-finance the first half of the value of an asset
assigned a risk-weight of 50 percent, like a residential mortgage, but the
remaining half of the asset’s value would have to be funded by some
qualifying blend of debt and equity.13 Because an unsecured loan was a
riskier investment, the bank would have to allocate more of its loss-
bearing capital (equity) to provide for this risk. Banks had to give
unsecured loans a 100 percent risk-weight. The weighting to be given
particular bank assets has changed over the years—and remains a bone of
contention—but the basic mechanism of risk weighting became a perma-
nent part of Basel rules.
The all-in regulatory capital cost of financing reflected both an asset’s
risk-weight and the amount that could be fully debt-financed. Assuming
that a firm had to set aside $8 of equity for every $100 of risk-weighted
asset exposure, it would have to finance an asset in the 100 percent
bucket (like the unsecured loan in the previous example) by qualifying
requirements. As a result, these calculations do not reflect actual capital
requirements for these portfolios.
13 Although sorting assets into four different risk “buckets” made the capital
standard more responsive to a bank’s risk, this scheme still let banks game the
weighting by letting them pick riskier assets—with a better chance of return—
within each risk bucket. Darryl Getter, U.S. Implementation of the Basel Capital
Regulatory Framework 3–10, Congressional Research Service (2012).
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equity capital up to 8 percent of its value. The rest of its value (92
percent) could be financed by borrowing. An asset in the 50 percent
bucket, however, would have an all-in regulatory capital cost of only 4
percent, because the 8 percent capital cost would apply only to half of the
asset’s value. Hence, 96 percent of its value could be financed by debt.
Assuming that debt is cheaper than equity, the first asset would be
cheaper to finance.
Not all liability and capital instruments have an equal ability to bear
loss, however. To identify the acceptable blend of debt and equity
financing, Basel I classified equity and para-equity into Tier 1 core
capital and Tier 2 supplementary capital. The most robust forms of
capital included common stock and surplus. Preferred stock had less
loss-bearing capacity than common with some kinds (like noncumulative
perpetual preferred) being more truly residual than others. So Tier 1
capital included the book value of common equity, noncumulative
preferred stock, and some minority interests in the equity capital
accounts of the bank’s consolidated subsidiaries. Tier 2 capital included
Tier 1 plus the loan-loss reserve, perpetual preferred stock, subordinated
notes, and some hybrid instruments.
Basel I also recognized that off-balance sheet assets and liabilities also
impacted a bank’s capital adequacy. This is especially true in the case of
credit commitments—like a stand-by letter of credit or a credit line—that
remain contingent because a counterparty decides whether to issue the
asset. For that reason, Basel I also provided a formula for converting
off-balance sheet items into on-balance sheet asset equivalents. In effect,
the conjunction of the asset weights and the Tier-based capital ratios put
in place a schedule of regulatory capital costs by type of asset. Regula-
tors could change the asset weights and the capital thresholds to calibrate
the overall system. Once the asset base and the qualifying capital had
been determined, the regulatory balance sheet could be tested for
compliance with the minimum capital thresholds.
An example in Table 7.1 shows how the regulatory balance sheet is
constructed. Imagine a quite modest bank with the following financial
balance sheet.
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Table 7.1 Bank’s financial balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Cash 2,450,000 Demand Deposits 5,000,000
U.S. Treasuries 1,500,000 One year CDs 1,000,000
Medium-term notes 1,000,000
Residential mortgages 2,000,000 Subordinated debt 2,400,000
Unsecured loans 2,000,000 Equity
Corporate debentures 2,000,000 Noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock
200,000
Goodwill 50,000 Common stock 400,000
Total 10,000,000 Total 10,000,000
Several adjustments must be made to construct the regulatory balance
sheet consistent with Basel I. Because the purpose of capital is to absorb
loss, intangible assets—in this case goodwill—should be deducted so as
to arrive at a more realistic estimate of the actual liquidity available to
absorb loss. To balance the deduction on the asset-side, the equity
account must also be adjusted dollar-for-dollar, because equity bears the
first loss arising from reduction in the value of assets. After reducing the
value of goodwill from both the asset and common stock accounts, the
pro forma balance sheet looks like Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 pro forma regulatory balance sheet #1 – net of goodwill
Assets Liabilities
Cash 2,450,000 Demand Deposits 5,000,000
U.S. Treasuries 1,500,000 One year CDs 1,000,000
Medium-term notes 1,000,000
Residential mortgages 2,000,000 Subordinated debt 2,400,000
Unsecured loans 2,000,000 Equity
Corporate debentures 2,000,000 Noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock
200,000
Common stock 350,000
Total 9,950,000 Total 9,950,000
The next step is to identify which assets need equity funding. These are
the only assets to be “booked” and carried on the (pro forma) regulatory
balance sheet. For example, the cash and the government securities get a
0 percent risk-weight, hence no portion of their value appears on the
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regulatory balance sheet. The mortgages receive a risk-weight of 50
percent, which means that one-half of their value is booked on the
regulatory balance sheet. The loans and debentures receive a risk-weight
of 100 percent, which means that the entire amount of the bank’s
investment in them must be funded—for regulatory purposes—by a blend
of equity and debt. After converting the actual assets into risk-weighted
assets, identifying the kind of capital that qualifies as truly loss-bearing
(and carrying over the intangible-discounted value of the bank’s equity),
the construction of the regulatory balance sheet is complete: see Table
7.3.
Table 7.3 Regulatory balance sheet #2 – net of debt-funded assets and
liabilities
Assets Equity
Residential mortgages 1,000,000 Preferred stock 200,000
Unsecured loans 2,000,000 Common stock 350,000
Corporate debentures 2,000,000
Total 5,000,000 Total 550,000
Granted, this pro forma exercise is no longer a balance sheet because it
ignores liabilities and assets that required no equity funding. Indeed, only
half of the bank’s gross balance sheet ($5m of $10m) requires any
regulatory capital at all. It is this (pro forma) asset balance that is now
tested for capital adequacy.
Dividing the qualifying capital by the risk-weighted asset base results
in a Tier 1 equity ratio of 11 percent (the sum of the preferred and
common). The rest of the risk-weighted asset base (89 percent) is funded
with borrowed money. Assuming that the minimum required of Tier 1
equity is 8 percent, the bank substantially exceeds the minimum. Its
risk-weighted leverage ratio is about 1:8, i.e., the bank borrows $8 for
every $1 of equity.
The outcome is different if we apply market capital standards that look
at the bank’s gross assets. In that case, the bank’s equity base must
support a higher asset base, i.e., $10 million rather than $5 million. In
terms of gross leverage, the bank’s assets would be supported 5.5 percent
by tangible equity and 94 percent by borrowed funds. Hence, the gross
leverage ratio is closer to 1:19, such that the bank has borrowed $19 for
every $1 of equity.
Imagine that some of the bank’s borrowers become insolvent such that
the bank must write down 20 percent of the value of the unsecured loans,
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i.e. $400,000.14 Because common stock bears the first loss (as in the
adjustment for goodwill), the value of the common stock must be written
down dollar-for-dollar. This loss would deplete the common and run
down the preferred by $50,000. The loss-adjusted regulatory balance
sheet would then look like Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 Regulatory balance sheet #3 – after write-down of asset and
equity
Assets Equity
Residential mortgages 1,000,000 Preferred stock 150,000
Unsecured loans 1,600,000 Common stock 0
Corporate debentures 2,000,000
Total 4,600,000 Total 150,000
Just as debt leverage multiplies a firm’s ability to invest in assets, it also
amplifies the consequences of loss on these assets. Hence, the conse-
quences of the equity write-down are more serious. As a result of the
loan write-off, the bank’s Tier 1 ratio now drops to less than 3.3 percent,
leaving it in violation of its minimum capital requirement. At this point,
the bank can choose between issuing more Tier 1 equity or reducing the
amount of its risk-weighted assets subject to minimum equity require-
ments. Assuming that the bank issues new equity and invests the
proceeds entirely in 0 percent weighted assets, e.g., cash, the bank could
meet its eight Tier 1 capital by raising as little as $218,000. Insofar as the
bank reinvests the proceeds in assets requiring some equity funding, e.g.,
residential mortgages, more equity capital would be needed to cover the
associated marginal equity surcharge on the regulatory balance sheet.
Alternatively, the bank could shrink its risk-weighted asset base. In
effect, this strategy asks ‘What is the maximum amount in risk-weighted
assets that can be supported with $150,000 in Tier 1 capital?’ Assuming a
minimum Tier 1 ratio of 8 percent, the answer is $1,875,000, suggesting
that the bank will have to make substantial reductions of its assets, i.e.,
$2,725,000.15
Its holdings of debentures and loans are more “expensive” than its
mortgages because they are risk-weighted at 100 percent, hence the
14 To keep matters simple, this chapter does not include the loan-loss reserve
that banks establish as a contra-asset account to absorb expected loss on its credit
portfolio.
15 Solving for x, the equation is 1,875,00 = $.08x.
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smallest asset reduction that would return the bank to compliance could
be accomplished by converting $2,725,000 of the debentures and loans
into cash. Assuming that all of the debentures and some of the loans are
sold, the risk-weighted pro forma balance sheet resulting after these
adjustments now has a Tier 1 capital ratio of 8 percent and looks like
Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 Regulatory balance sheet #4 – assuming conversion of the
debentures and some loans into cash
Assets Equity
Residential mortgages 1,000,000 Preferred stock 150,000
Unsecured loans 875,000 Common stock 0
Total 1,875,000 Total 150,000
Leaving the regulatory capital calculation, what does the bank’s financial
balance sheet look like after writing down the equity and selling the loans
and debentures, assuming reinvestment of the sale proceeds into cash?
See Table 7.6.
Table 7.6 Bank’s financial balance sheet – after write-down
Assets Liabilities
Cash 5,175,000 Demand Deposits 5,000,000
U.S. Treasuries 1,500,000 One year CDs 1,000,000
Medium-term notes 1,000,000
Residential mortgages 2,000,000 Subordinated debt 2,400,000
Unsecured loans 875,000 Equity
Noncumulative perpetual preferred
stock
200,000
Goodwill 50,000 Common stock 0
Total 9,600,000 Total 9,600,000
Rather than reinvesting the asset-sales into cash, the bank could also have
chosen to use the $2,725,000 to redeem its subordinated debt and
$225,000 of its medium-term notes, becoming a smaller, dramatically
less-leveraged institution, as in Table 7.7. Because the Tier 1 ratio is
calculated only on the basis of risk-adjusted assets and Tier 1 capital, this
smaller less leveraged entity would have the same Tier 1 ratio, although
its gross leverage ratio would be lower, as suggested in Table 7.7.
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Table 7.7 Bank’s financial balance sheet – assuming debt repayment
rather than holding cash
Assets Liabilities
Cash 2,450,000 Demand Deposits 5,000,000
U.S. Treasuries 1,500,000 One year CDs 1,000,000
Medium-term notes 675,000
Residential mortgages 2,000,000
Unsecured loans 875,000 Equity
Noncumulative perpetual preferred
stock
200,000
Goodwill 50,000 Common stock 0
Total 6,875,000 Total 6,875,000
Self-Evaluation of Capital Adequacy: Basel II and Internal Models
The business of banking kept changing after the adoption of Basel I as
yield-hungry banks increased their derivatives activities and began sub-
stituting riskier loans for low-risk securities.16 Not surprisingly, modifi-
cations to the first Basel proposal were proposed in 2004 as the Capital
Adequacy Framework (“Basel II”).17 Notably, it gave banks substantial
discretion in picking how their regulatory capital would be calculated.18
The process of letting banks evaluate their own capital adequacy had
begun in 1996, when regulators let banks use proprietary risk models to
estimate the market risk in their asset portfolios. Basel II would expand
this discretion by letting banks choose between calculating their capital
requirements under a modified version of Basel I or using their own
internal statistical models. Banks that used their own models could
16 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 5, at 4. See generally
Heidi Mandanis Schooner and Michael Taylor, supra note 4, at 147–64.
17 Although Basel II expected to become effective in the United States in
2008, the agencies granted waivers from compliance for certain aspects of Basel
II due to the financial crisis.
18 Basel II also took account of “operational risk,” an umbrella category for
contingencies not related to credit or market risk but that could, nonetheless,
impact a bank’s solvency.
The rise of risk-based regulatory capital 213
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Markham_Research_Handbook_on_Securities / Division: CHAPTER07Edited_Gabilondo /Pg. Position:
13 / Date: 9/5
Jerry Markham and Rigers Gjyshi - 9781782540069
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/15/2014 05:49:03AM
via Edward Elgar Publishing
JOBNAME: Markham PAGE: 14 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 24 09:26:59 2014
choose between using statistical assumptions provided by regulators or
developing their own assumptions, known as the “advanced approach.”19
Large banks welcomed the discretion, which often let them save on
regulatory capital costs.20 For example, under Basel I, a bank would have
to hold capital of $8 to support an AAA-rated loan of $100. The cost for
that loan would be lower under any of the Basel II options, dropping to
$1.81 under the standard approach, $1.41 under the internal ratings
model approach, and somewhere between $.037 and $4.45 for the
advanced approach. At the same time, though, riskier loans tended to
require a higher capital charge. For example, under Basel I, a $100
B-rated loan would require $8 of capital (the same as the AAA loan).
Under Basel II, the equity cost would rise to $12.21 in the standard
approach, $18.53 in the internal ratings model, and between $3.97 and
$41.65 under the advanced model approach.
Regulators modified Basel II in 2009 in response to the 2007 financial
crisis to better track the credit risk in the securities traded by banks.
Known as Basel II.5, these revisions attempted to limit a kind of
regulatory arbitrage made possible by accounting differences in how a
firm recorded its investments in debt securities.21 If a firm intended to
hold the debt security to maturity, it could be booked at its historic cost,
ignoring ongoing fluctuation of the market price. However, if a firm
intended to sell a security rather than hold it to maturity, it would have to
mark the value of the security to market, increasing the volatility of its
gross earnings. Hence, banks could strategically assign securities with
unrealized built-in gain to their trading book—that way boosting the
bank’s asset value—and relegate securities with built-in loss to the
banking book.
Capital After the Crisis
The financial crisis that began in 2007 cast a harsh spotlight on
regulatory capital requirements, in part because they did not obviate the
need for large-scale public bailouts of illiquid and insolvent banks.
19 In the basic and more conservative approach, the bank would estimate the
probability of a default on its assets and the regulators would provide the
expected loss given default, the bank’s exposure at default, and the maturity at
exposure. Using the advanced approach, the bank would use its own values
rather than those of the regulator.
20 The following estimates of regulatory capital costs appear in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 5, at 2.
21 Darryl Getter, supra note 13, at 3–4.
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Consequently, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) sought to
raise minimum regulatory capital requirements and to extend them to
previously unregulated firms that participated in the credit market.22
Released in 2010, Basel III also raised capital requirements, gave
regulators more options to address the capital impact of financial cycles,
and enhanced requirements about liquidity.23 The final contours of the
new capital requirements will not be known until federal agencies issue
regulations, but the discussion below outlines the major features of the
capital changes envisioned by Dodd-Frank and Basel III.
New charges and standards
Much of what Basel III does is refine the existing tools and standards,
including the definition of capital and the ratios. For example, Tier 1
capital is now divided into two categories: Common Equity Tier 1
(“CET1”) and total Tier 1. CET1 is the most residual layer of the bank’s
capital, where the first losses and short-term volatility will be absorbed.24
Total Tier 1 is the sum of CETI plus some adjustments. In addition to
raising risk-based capital requirements, Basel III establishes a leverage
ratio, calculated by dividing the bank’s Tier 1 capital by an expanded
asset base not just the bank’s risk-weighted assets. Set at a minimum of 3
percent, this leverage ratio is not required of all banks; rather, regulators
impose it on banks selectively.
Basel III also adds new “charges” designed to mitigate financial
cycles—a capital conservation buffer and a counter-cyclical buffer. The
capital conservation buffer prohibits banks from making certain distribu-
tions to their owners or paying discretionary bonuses unless the bank has
an adequate capital buffer in excess of its minimum capital requirements.
Supervisors also retain discretion to modify capital charges in order to
make requirements more counter-cyclical, i.e., greater as a credit bubble
inflates but smaller after it bursts.
22 Dodd-Frank also prohibits the use of trust-preferred securities as Tier 1,
although this ban is phased in and subject to grandfather to avoid shocking the
capital structure of banks that relied on them.
23 The Fed approved some of the Basel III rules in July 2013 and said that
more would be forthcoming. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20130702a.htm.
24 CET1 is calculated like tangible net equity for private firms because it is
the sum of common stock, related surplus, and retained earnings minus a variety
of charges (including goodwill, other intangibles, securitization gain on sale, and
fair value changes in the bank’s financial liabilities) that remove residual assets
of dubious liquidity. By imposing more stringent criteria it is hoped that banks
will be better able to absorb unexpected losses.
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Dodd-Frank requires bank holding companies and other financial
companies to assess their capital adequacy through statistical stress tests
that posit how their liquidity and solvency would fare under adverse
market conditions. Also, the Fed must now conduct an annual stress test
of large bank holding companies and certain entities designed by the
FSOC, to determine whether these entities have sufficient capital to
absorb losses resulting from negative market conditions.25
However, legal uncertainty remains about what the new capital mini-
mums are because Dodd-Frank defines them in terms of “generally
applicable” risk-based capital and leverage requirements in effect when
the statute was passed, which includes Basel I and features of Basel II.26
Because regulatory capital rules were already changing during this
period, identifying the precise contours of this standard may be difficult.
Moreover, Dodd-Frank directs prudential regulators to use regulatory
capital to mitigate systemic risk, a notion that continues to evolve. As a
result, regulators will have to become more specific about the capital
standards to which financial firms are expected to adhere.
Liquidity and funding
The financial crisis revealed that markets could treat solvent but illiquid
firms as though they were insolvent. Regulators responded by paying
more attention to a firm’s funding liquidity. To that end, Basel III
imposes two new requirements designed to promote a bank’s funding
stability—a Liquidity Coverage Ratio and a Net Stable Funding Ratio.
Designed to promote the bank’s short-term stability, the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio requires the bank to have enough liquid assets on-hand to
honor its obligations for 30 days, even in crisis conditions in which the
bank would be locked out of its funding markets. Cash, deposits at
central banks, and some sovereign obligations would qualify as conform-
ing assets, as would others of sufficient credit quality, liquidity or
transferability. In general, when determining which of the bank’s assets
count as liquid, its holdings of liabilities issued by commercial banks,
investment firms, financial holding companies, insurance companies or
liabilities issued by a parent or subsidiary of the bank would not count.
25 In November 2012, the Fed conducted a systematic stress test of capital
for 18 bank holding companies, including several with large trading and
mark-to-market exposures. Styled as the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and
Review, it also incorporated stress-testing requirements mandated by the Dodd-
Frank Act. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests/dodd-
frank-act-stress-testing.html.
26 Darryl Getter, supra note 13, at 3–5.
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The Net Stable Funding Ratio promotes funding stability over a
longer-term horizon, i.e., one year. It classifies the sources of a bank’s
financing in terms of its permanence and callability. All of a bank’s Tier
1 and 2 capital plus preferred stock with a maturity of over one year
counts as stable funding dollar for dollar. Other forms of funding
common to banks are discounted based on the risk that they may not be
refinanced upon maturity. In effect, this ratio imposes a maturity tax on
funding by reducing the compliance value of longer-term funding.
BROKER-DEALER REGULATORY CAPITAL
The SEC imposes regulatory capital rules on registered broker-dealers.
The primary goal of these rules is to ensure that broker-dealers hold
enough liquid assets to make good on their obligations to customers and
other creditors in the case of liquidation. Although bank regulators have
now increased their surveillance of liquidity, the net capital rule has long
recognized the crucial link between the market liquidity of a firm’s assets
and the firm’s own liquidity. Recently, the SEC has let some large
broker-dealers demonstrate their capital adequacy by using internal
statistical models, similar to those approved by Basel II. Most broker-
dealers calculate their minimum capital using the traditional approach,
but the largest broker-dealers use this alternative internal models
approach.
The Net Capital Rule
In the late 1960s, several broker-dealers became insolvent, producing
losses to their customers. As a result, Congress directed the SEC to adopt
a rule to protect customers from loss by promoting minimum capital
levels at registered broker-dealers. Congress also established the Secur-
ities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) to provide limited
indemnification to investors for losses in their accounts at insolvent
broker-dealers.27
In response, the SEC implemented a revised regulatory capital
standard—the uniform net capital rule.28 The goal of the rule was to
allow a broker-dealer that was no longer a going concern to honor its
duties to customers and other creditors in the case of self-liquidation. A
customer might still have recourse to funds through SIPC, but the net
27 Michael Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 Bus. Law. 863, 864–65 (1991).
28 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3–1—Net capital requirements for brokers or dealers.
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capital rule was designed to promote orderly self-liquidation rather than a
SIPC liquidation, which would involve limited recovery and delays.
Like the regulatory capital process for a bank, the net capital calcula-
tion generates a pro forma balance sheet and then tests it for capital
adequacy. The process involves two steps. First, the firm’s actual net
capital is calculated, by calculating the tentative net capital and then
finalizing it with asset haircuts. Second, the firm’s net capital requirement
is calculated using either a leverage ratio or a method based on the firm’s
customer assets.
The calculation of the actual net capital starts by determining the
firm’s equity according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“GAAP”). This involves marking to market the firm’s securities posi-
tions and recognizing unrealized gains and losses. Then some adjust-
ments are made to GAAP equity to conform the balance sheet to the net
capital rule. As in the bank case, goodwill and other liquid assets are
deducted from the balance sheet. Unlike the bank case, some of the
broker-dealer’s subordinated debt is also counted as qualifying capital
because it can absorb unexpected loss.29 This part of the calculation
generates tentative net capital.
Important adjustments are then made to the broker-dealer’s assets to
finalize the net capital calculation. The valuation of an asset as part of a
going concern is predicated on the notion that the broker-dealer would
have some discretion in selling it, such that the assumed price is as
favorable as the seller can obtain. In contrast, the net capital rule adopts
the perspective of liquidation in which the broker-dealer is forced to sell
assets without the luxury of waiting for the best possible price. To
estimate a liquidation price for assets that reflects this price risk, the net
capital rule applies discounts (“haircuts”) to assets intended to reflect
what they would fetch if sold in haste. This approach results in
conservative pricing of a broker-dealer’s assets.
Once this regulatory balance sheet has been calculated, there are two
alternative methods of meeting the firm’s minimum net capital require-
ment: (i) a basic method that measures the adequacy of net capital
against a set of the firm’s unsecured liabilities, and (ii) an alternative
method that compares net capital to assets generated from the firm’s
29 To qualify as net capital, the subordinated debt must have a term of at least
one year and be fully subordinated to other creditors, including customers of the
broker-dealer. For purposes of this exercise, assume that all of the subordinated
debt will count in the net capital calculation.
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dealings with customers. According to the basic method, the broker-
dealer must hold at least $1 of capital for every $15 of its uncollateral-
ized debt. This requirement directly limits the broker-dealer’s ability to
leverage itself. The second method lets the broker-dealer calculate its
minimum net capital as a minimum percentage of the firm’s obligations
to its customers. Any net liquidity above this minimum requirement is
considered excess net capital.
To understand a simple version of the net capital calculation, consider
the following stylized broker-dealer balance sheet in Table 7.8.30
Table 7.8 Broker-dealer’s financial balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Aggregate indebtedness
Cash 3,000,000 + Customer payables 5,000,000
U.S. Treasuries 3,500,000 + Two month commercial paper 1,000,000
Customer receivables
(unsecured)
500,000 + Medium-term notes 1,000,000
Corporate equities 1,000,000 Subordinated debt 2,500,000
Unsecured loans 500,000 Equity
Noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock
100,000
Goodwill 1,500,000 Common stock 400,000
Total 10,000,000 Total 10,000,000
To identify only the liquid assets available to honor the firm’s obliga-
tions, the goodwill, unsecured customer receivables, and unsecured loans
are all deducted on the theory that they have no ready market in which
they could be converted to cash. Based on this balance sheet, the size of
this adjustment will eliminate all of the firm’s equity. Since net capital
includes qualifying subordinated debt, however, the subordinated debt
can bear the rest of the adjustment. The resulting balance sheet in Table
7.9 indicates a tentative net capital of $500,000.
30 The net capital rule establishes different requirements based on the type of
business that a broker-dealer maintains. Because these requirements are quite
intricate, this example presents an elemental version of the calculation.
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Table 7.9 Broker-dealer’s tentative net capital – net illiquid assets
Assets Liabilities
Aggregate indebtedness
Cash 3,000,000 + Customer payables 5,000,000
U.S. Treasuries 3,500,000 + Two month commercial paper 1,000,000
+ Medium-term notes 1,000,000
Corporate equities 1,000,000 Subordinated debt 500,000
Equity
Noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock
0
Common stock 0
Total 7,500,000 Total 7,500,000
Since the net capital calculation assumes a forced liquidation in which
assets would have to be sold quickly, some of the assets must be haircut.
The cash is not haircut. Although some government securities may be
subject to haircuts, assume for purposes of this problem that the U.S.
Treasuries are short-term securities deemed to be risk-free, such that the
only assets that must be haircut are the equity securities. For simplicity of
calculation, assume that they are haircut by 20 percent, i.e., $200,000.
Since the subordinated debt account has become the first loss position
(once the write-down for goodwill has burned through the common and
preferred equity), it too must be reduced by $200,000. This is the
resulting balance sheet at Table 7.10.
Table 7.10 Broker-dealer’s net capital—net illiquid assets and asset haircut
Assets Liabilities
Aggregate indebtedness
Cash 3,000,000 + Customer payables 5,000,000
U.S. Treasuries 3,500,000 + Two month commercial paper 1,000,000
+ Medium-term notes 1,000,000
Corporate equities 800,000 Subordinated debt 300,000
Equity
Noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock
0
Common stock 0
Total 7,300,000 Total 7,300,000
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Now the broker-dealer must calculate its net capital requirements and
compare them against its actual net capital. As noted above, the broker-
dealer may choose between two methods. Under the first method, the
firm must hold the greater of $250,000 or $1 of net capital for every $15
of aggregate indebtedness. The firm’s remaining subordinated debt—
$300,000—does exceed $250,000. Assuming that all of its liabilities (not
the subordinated debt) count as aggregate indebtedness, the broker-
dealer’s relevant debts equal $7,000,000. To qualify under the first
method, the firm’s net capital would have to be at least $470,000, which
exceeds the firm’s remaining subordinated debt of $300,000.
A second method—which often results in a lower minimum net
capital—lets the broker-dealer calculate its minimum net capital as the
greater of $250,000 or 2 percent of its customer receivables. Two percent
of its customer receivables of $500,000 is only $10,000. Because the
firm’s subordinated debt exceeds the $250,000 floor, the firm’s net capital
is sufficient to meet its net capital requirements.
A broker-dealer must perform these regulatory capital computations
daily and notify the SEC if it is at risk of not meeting its minimum net
capital requirements. A broker-dealer must also file quarterly reports of
financial condition and an annual report, with audited financial state-
ments. As measured by the few broker-dealers that have undergone SIPC
liquidation since it was adopted, the net capital rule has been relatively
successful in promoting financial integrity.
Internal Models Approach
In 2004, the SEC amended the net capital rule to let qualifying
broker-dealers demonstrate their minimum net capital with internal
risk-management models that used statistical methods to forecast loss.
This was attractive to broker-dealers that belonged to large financial
conglomerates.31 Many of these conglomerates already had sophisticated
risk-management systems designed to comply with their banking regula-
tors, so an argument was made that net capital compliance for broker-
dealers that belonged to such conglomerates could be based on internal
models like those approved for banks in Basel II.
31 The idea for it came out of an experiment by six large securities firms that
used their own models to calculate the amount of portfolio risk they faced in
their over-the-counter derivatives portfolios. General Accounting Office, RISK
BASED CAPITAL Regulatory and Industry Approaches to Capital and Risk 7,
14, GGD-98–153 (1998).
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The internal models method gave broker-dealers more flexibility in
maintaining capital adequacy by reducing the deductions that would
otherwise have to be taken to reflect the market and credit risks in their
portfolios. As a result, these firms could reduce their minimum net
capital and then upstream excess capital to their holding company.
Nevertheless, broker-dealers using the alternative approach must hold a
tentative net capital of at least $1 billion.32 They must also hold net
capital of at least $500 million.
Firms using the internal models method would no longer have to use
the SEC’s asset haircuts, but they would have to provide information
about their risk models. The broker-dealer’s holding company also had to
agree to provide the SEC regularly with comprehensive information
about the financial condition of the broker-dealer, the holding company
and its affiliates.
While attractive to the firm, this relaxation of capital constraints is
viewed by many as having contributed to the financial crisis of 2007.
Since then, some broker-dealers that had used this alternative converted
to bank holding companies, thereby becoming subject to the prudential
oversight of the Fed.33
INSURANCE COMPANIES
Insurance companies in the U.S. follow risk-based capital standards
developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”) and imposed by individual states.
State Regulation
As of yet, little research demonstrates that insurance companies present
systemic risks to the financial sector.34 The federal government does not
indemnify policyholders for losses incurred when insurance companies
32 The requirements to qualify for this method are found in Appendix E to 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3–1.
33 Five broker-dealers participated in the program: Goldman Sachs, Merrill
Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley. Lehman Brothers
has since declared bankruptcy. Bear Stearns was acquired by J.P. Morgan, a
bank. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have moved their operations to be
under the Fed as their principal regulator.
34 Mary Weiss, Systemic Risk and the U.S. Insurance Sector 2; Richard
Herring and Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks,
Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies in Hal Scott (ed.), Capital Adequacy
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become insolvent. Insurance is largely regulated by states, which have a
commissioner or director to monitor the conditions under which insur-
ance can be offered. Individual states operate guaranty funds to cover
some shortfalls in insurance coverage, but the recovery provided by these
funds is often limited.35 When an insurance company fails, any resulting
loss tends to be borne by policyholders, other creditors and shareholders.
As a result, there has been no federal prudential oversight of insurance
companies, although they must conform to state standards about capital
adequacy. This type of state regulation of insurance capital involves (i)
guidelines on how an insurance company should establish its minimum
net capital based on its business lines and (ii) statutes that give state
regulators the authority to take actions against an insurance company if it
becomes financially impaired.
NAIC has also developed the Risk-Based Capital (“RBC”) for Insurers
Model Act (“Model Act”), which has been adopted by all states (except
Texas) and the District of Columbia. Used as an accreditation standard by
the NAIC, the Model Act defines regulatory capital by incorporating by
reference the level of “statutory capital” that insurance companies must
hold under state law. State law also exposes reinsurers to similar capital
standards.36 While depository institutions follow GAAP, insurance com-
panies follow statutory accounting principles that tend to be more
actuarially conservative than GAAP.
In addition to these state-level constraints, large insurance companies
now face the risk of being classified as “systemically important financial
institutions,” which would make them subject to prudential oversight by
the Fed. Also, if an insurance company owns a savings and loan, then it
becomes a “savings and loan holding company” (“SLHC”) now subject
to regulation by the Fed under the terms of Dodd-Frank. Until now,
insurance companies that were also SLHCs did not have to comply with
formal regulatory capital requirements, but the Fed may change that. In
particular, the Fed may require these insurance companies to use GAAP
(which the Fed requires bank holding companies to use) rather than the
more conservative statutory accounting principles that insurance com-
panies use.
Beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance, 17 (Oxford, 2005). The AIG
Financial Products Unit was not part of AIG’s regular insurance operations.
35 Weiss, id. at 8.
36 Scott Harrington, Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance in Hal
Scott (ed.), Capital Adequacy Beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance,
110 (Oxford, 2005).
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Determining Minimum Risk-Based Capital Requirements
Insurers face the risk that the ultimate cost of paying claims will exceed
the amounts set aside to fund those claims.37 An insurer undertakes to
pay claims on the occurrence of certain loss events. The insurer pre-funds
the costs of settling these claims by charging customers premiums. It
reduces its net risk by diversifying through pooling many such contracts
and by transferring risk to a reinsurer. The risk-based framework used in
this business identifies five general kinds of risk that insurance com-
panies face—asset, interest, underwriting, and business risk.
Asset risk refers to the potential that the company’s assets (including
fixed income securities, equity shares and real estate) will lose value.
Interest rate risk refers to the generic potential for loss due to changes in
levels of the interest rate. Underwriting risk refers to the possibility that
the firm has made mistakes when calculating the potential for loss on its
core business. Mistakes can include errors in forecasting mortality or
casualty.38 Such mistakes may be expressed in underestimating the
reserves or the price of premiums for coverage. Eventually these mistakes
would be reflected in a balance sheet liability called the policyholders’
fund, which reflects the aggregate value of the company’s duty to pay
claims.39 Similar to underwriting risk, business risk refers to unexpected
fluctuations in premium income, annuity costs and other liabilities.
Some of these same risks are common to other financial firms.40
However, the liabilities that an insurer takes on—in the form of promises
to honor claims—may stretch out over a long period. As a result,
insurance companies often remain relatively liquid because they have
time to adjust to unexpected losses or liquidity events. For this reason,
assuming liquidation values—as the net capital rule does for broker-
dealers—makes little sense in an insurance context.
The risk profile of any particular insurer will depend on the kind of
business that it conducts. To respond to the particular risk profiles of
these different lines of insurance, NAIC has developed separate quantita-
tive formulas that establish minimum net capital requirements for life
insurance, property and casualty insurance, and health insurance. For
example, life insurers face less risk because morbidity and mortality can
37 Id. at 88.
38 General Accounting Office, supra note 31, at 10.
39 Richard Herring and Til Schuermann, supra note 34, at 28.
40 As with banks and broker-dealers, market risk also becomes relevant
because if the insurance company’s assets underperform that will also compro-
mise its ability to make good on its promises. Id. at 17.
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be estimated with a relatively high degree of actuarial accuracy.41 In
contrast, property and casualty insurers face the risk of unexpected
losses. Capital standards for nonlife insurers provision for asset, credit,
underwriting, and off-balance sheet risks.42 Those for life insurers plan
for asset, underwriting, interest rate, and business risks.43
In the 1990s, NAIC began using internal statistical models to estimate
risk-based capital for life insurance activities.44 In the NAIC framework,
the insurer must calculate its risk-based capital both based on its own
internal assumptions as well as with NAIC-mandated assumptions. State
regulators tend to rely on a firm’s own testing of its model rather than
submitting models to a centralized review.45 Because these models are
intended to capture risks that escape measurement in the standard
risk-based formulas, the use of internal models has often tended to
increase an insurance company’s minimum capital, i.e., the opposite of
what happened for broker-dealers.46 At present, the use of internal
models has not become the norm for other kinds of insurance businesses.
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
The last financial crisis showed that unregulated financial firms—like
AIG’s Financial Products Group—could negatively impact the financial
system as much and often more than could regulated firms. In response,
Dodd-Frank gave the FSOC the power to identify firms whose potential
systemic impact would justify the imposition of risk-based capital and
leverage requirements.47
Statutory Classification
Dodd-Frank provides a two-step process in which a firm must first be
deemed a “nonbank financial company,” and then further classified as a
systemically important nonbank financial institution (“SIFI”). Status as a
41 Harrington, supra note 36, at 101.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Therese Vaughn, The Implications of Solvency II for U.S. Insurance
Regulation 7, (Feb. 2009) 2009-PB-03.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Section 113 of Dodd-Frank Act.
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nonbank financial company depends on quantitative criteria to evaluate
whether a company is predominantly engaged in financial activities. A
firm is predominantly engaged in financial activities if (i) 85 percent of
its gross revenues come from ownership of depository institutions or the
conduct of financial activities, or (ii) 85 percent of its assets are financial
or related to its ownership of depository institutions. These thresholds
cast a wide net that brings in various asset managers (pension funds,
mutual funds, investment funds, special-purpose vehicles), hedge funds,
private equity funds, sovereign wealth funds, and insurance and reinsur-
ance entities.
The second step—becoming a SIFI—depends on whether the nonbank
financial company may expose the U.S. economy to financial instability
by virtue of (i) financial distress at the company, or (ii) the nature, scope,
size, scale, concentration, or interconnectedness, of the company’s activ-
ities. To flesh out this standard, the FSOC has published a rule that
establishes a three-part process—including appeal rights—to determine
whether a nonbank financial company is a SIFI.
First, any nonbank financial company will be subject to an initial
screening if it has more than $50 billion in consolidated assets and one of
five other factors that target high leverage, liquidity risk and derivatives
activities. For U.S. companies, these thresholds are applied to global
assets, liabilities and operations of the company and its subsidiaries. For
foreign companies, only United States assets, liabilities and operations of
the foreign nonbank financial company and its subsidiaries count. Next,
the FSOC will analyze companies captured in this initial screening based
on a six-category framework to determine the company’s exposure to
financial distress and its potential impact on the broader economy.
Companies found to pose risk enter the final stage of the process, at
which point, the FSOC will request information—including confidential
business information—from the company. The FSOC then makes its final
determination.
On June 3, 2013, the FSOC issued its first proposed determinations of
nonbank financial companies to be designated as SIFIs. Three companies
had been under consideration—AIG, Prudential Insurance and GE Capi-
tal. Both AIG and Prudential Insurance were deemed SIFIs, suggesting
that insurance business models may be at particular risk for this
regulatory status.48 Prudential Insurance is appealing the decision,
48 The Fed also regulates AIG as a savings and loan holding company
because AIG owns a thrift, AIG Federal Savings Bank.
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becoming the first insurance company likely to adjudicate the question of
whether insurance companies pose systemic risks to the financial sector.
Capital Standards
A firm deemed to be a SIFI becomes subject to prudential oversight by
the Fed of its capital structure similar to that imposed on banks. The Fed
has statutory authority to exempt a SIFI from risk-based capital and
leverage requirements. To date, the Fed has suggested that prudential
standards for a SIFI could be tailored to an individual firm or to a
business line. SIFIs will likely be subject to several capital and liquidity
requirements akin to those currently applicable to banks and bank
holding companies. If so, the SIFI would have to provide the Fed with
quarterly reports about its capital adequacy, develop a contingency
funding plan explaining how the company would fund itself during
extreme liquidity events, and provide an annual capital plan addressing
capital adequacy under financial stress. The SIFI may also have to hold a
liquidity buffer along the lines of the net liquidity coverage ratio
introduced by Basel III.
Complying with some of these requirements may require a firm to
develop new risk-management processes. For example, in order to
determine whether it complies with the limit on counterparty exposure, a
firm must add up all positions with the counterparty. Whether a SIFI
might also enjoy privileged access to central bank liquidity like that
enjoyed by banks remains to be seen given that its systemic relevance
may help to justify access to emergency stabilizing liquidity.
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